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As Judge Renfrew recognizes, the first step in determining an ap-
propriate criminal sentence is to identify the purposes to be served by
sentencing persons convicted of the particular type of crime. In the
paper label case, unfortunately, Judge Renfrew failed to identify all
the purposes of white-collar sentencing and to appreciate the supe-
riority of imprisonment as a means of achieving general deterrence-
the purpose he did identify.
The Judge correctly observes that in an antitrust sentencing decision
such purposes of criminal sentencing as incapacitation and rehabilita-
tion are not involved. We do not send a price fixer to jail to keep him
during that period of time from engaging in continued price fixing.
And certainly no one would claim any rehabilitative effect from the
imposition of criminal punishment on those pillars of the community
who agree with their competitors to fix prices.
But the conclusion that incapacitation and rehabilitation are ir-
relevant does not necessarily rule out imprisonment as an appropriate
sentence. Before excluding incarceration as an option, we must com-
plete our consideration of the purposes that are supposed to be served
by sentencing price fixers. General deterrence is perhaps the primary
purpose for which the legal system invokes the criminal sanction to
deal with price fixing and most other economic offenses.' The concept
of general deterrence, the punishment of today's offender for the
purpose of discouraging others from engaging in similar conduct,
derives its support from the Benthamite philosophy of utilitarianism.
As such, deterrence recognizes the validity of imposing a cost on one
person in order to bring about a greater benefit for society as a whole.
For example, in setting out the objectives of the Model Penal Code,
Herbert Wechsler noted that "while invocation of a penal sanction
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1. As for specific deterrence, we are not familiar with any study on the level of
recidivism among individuals convicted of price fixing. It is reasonable to assume, how-
ever, that a corporate officer convicted of price fixing who returns to an executive
position after receiving little or no punishment may decide that it is worthwhile to
engage in price fixing again.
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necessarily depends on past behavior, the object is control of harmful
conduct in the future.
' 2
This consideration is especially important in price fixing and other
covert economic crimes. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment cannot hope to monitor the competitive behavior of every
business entity in our economy any more than the Internal Revenue
Service can monitor effectively every taxpayer. Accordingly, primary
reliance must be placed upon voluntary conformity with the law,
backed by the threat of sanctions brought against those who attempt
to further their own economic advantage, or that of their corporation,
by violating the law.
A sentencing strategy that stresses general deterrence is likely to be
particularly effective in the field of economic activity. Individuals and
firms that conspire to fix prices are motivated by neither passion nor
poverty. They have ample opportunity to calculate their courses of
action and to weigh the risks against the expected gains. Judge Renfrew
shares this perception of price fixing,3 but he ignores its corollary.
Precisely because price fixing is a crime involving rational choice, it
takes a substantial enforcement effort and a substantial punishment to
make and keep the deterrent threat a potent one.
Furthermore, the general-deterrent purpose of white-collar sen-
tencing cannot be considered apart from a related purpose to which
Judge Renfrew pays too little attention: the preservation of public
confidence in our legal system. Crimes by prominent corporations and
businessmen "establish an example which tends to erode the moral
base of the law and provide an opportunity for other kinds of of-
fenders to rationalize their misconduct."4 This erosion of confidence
in the law is increased when it is perceived that blue-collar criminals
go to jail and white-collar criminals do not. Those who argue that
price fixers, being nonviolent, do little damage to the fabric of our
society and therefore do not warrant severe punishment must also
2. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 H,\Rv. L. Rev. 1097, 1105
(1952). Another commentator on general deterrence observed:
[T]he singular power of the criminal law resides . . . not in its coercive effect oil
those caught in its toils but rather in its effect oil the rest of us. That effect is a
highly complex one. It includes elements of coercion and of terror: if I do as he
did, I too shall suffer for it. But it also includes conscious and unconscious moralizing
and habit-forming effects that go far beyond the crassness of a narrowly conceived
deterrence.
H. PACKER, THE LIMiTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 69 (1968).
3. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 593-94
(1977).
4. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 104 (1967).
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recognize that society punishes those who engage in a wide range of
nonviolent criminal activity. Those who steal thousands or millions of
dollars by nonviolent larceny, burglary, fraud, counterfeiting, em-
bezzlement, and various types of organized crime are commonly
punished by incarceration. If it is the "respectability" of an offender
rather than the character of his offense that lies at the heart of much
price-fixing sentencing, then judges are making ad hominem distinc-
tions that should be alien to a government of laws and not of men.
The question, then, is what form of punishment best serves the
relevant objectives-that of deterring persons and corporations from
conspiring with their competitors to fix prices and that of maintaining
confidence in the criminal justice system. Various sources suggest that
a prison term, rather than some alternative penalty, is most likely to
achieve these objectives. The ABA's project, Standards Relating to
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, for example, supports a sen-
tence of total confinement in those cases in which imposition of a
different sentence would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
offense.0 The commentary to that section notes that "[f]or certain of-
fenses, such as embezzlement from a bank, the failure to impose a
prison sentence might be unduly encouraging to similar attempts in
the future and might destroy the confidence of the public in the
system."" The same considerations that justify imprisoning those who
perpetrate the premeditated white-collar crime of bank embezzlement
apply to the sentencing of price fixers. Indeed, the key difference be-
tween embezzlement and price fixing is that in the embezzlement case
the victim (the bank) is more visible and the loss more easily cal-
culated. This is, of course, no reason to treat the two crimes differently
for purposes of deterrence. Both are a " 'non-violent form of theft.' --
As Judge Renfrew notes, to be an effective general deterrent a sen-
tence must not only be widely known but also widely abhorred by
potential offenders.8 Experience supports the conclusion that business-
men view prison as uniquely unpleasant and that therefore incarcera-
tion is a uniquely effective deterrent. This conclusion was given
striking confirmation by the events following the sentencing of seven
corporate executives for price fixing in the electrical equipment in-
dustry 16 years ago. On February 7, 1961, front-page headlines of the
New York Times announced, "Seven Electrical Officials Get Jail
5. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNA-IIVES AND PROCEDURES § 2.5(c)(iii) (Approved Draft 1968).
6. Id. § 2.5(n), at 107.
7. Renfrew, supra note 3, at 612 (quoting responding attorney).
8. Id. at 594.
The Yale Law Journal
Terms in Trust Case-GE and Westinghouse Vice Presidents Must
Serve Thirty Days."9 The article was complete with photographs of
some of the sentenced men. The men sentenced were "typical business-
men in appearance, men who would never be taken for lawbreakers."10
The article described the sentencing, including the scene in which the
first executive sentenced, as he turned to go back to his seat in the
courtroom, was grabbed by a marshal and escorted off to prison. Read-
ing that account must have shocked more than a few businessmen.
What was the effect of prison on those who served time? In testi-
mony before a Senate committee, a general manager from General
Electric, who had served 30 days in prison, testified with respect to his
involvement in the price-fixing conspiracy: "They would never get me
to do it again as I feel it now. I would starve before I would do it
again."" Another former general manager and vice president of Gen-
eral Electric, who had also served time in prison, testified about the
effect of the sentences on the business community: "I think that this
example that was shown to us has been far reaching. I think that a lot
of people now have reevaluated their sense of values .... ,,12 He ob-
served that "realizing the taint of a jail sentence is enough to put some
fear into people, and then once fear is in people then they start look-
ing at the moral values a little bit on whether or not [price fixing]
makes any sense.'
3
There is additional evidence of the effect these sentences had upon
other businessmen. Some old Department of Justice files reveal that
clandestine price-fixing meetings that had been held regularly for a
number of years in many large industries, including the tire industry,'
4
were abandoned in the aftermath of the publicity about the prison
sentences imposed on the electrical industry executives. The in-
creasing number of price-fixing conspiracies being uncovered today
indicates that unfortunately the deterrent effect of a few 30-day sen-
tences does not endure.
Sentencing for the purpose of deterrence makes the character of the
offense, rather than that of the offender, the central determinant in
the sentencing decision. Individual offender characteristics, such as
9. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1961, at 1, col. 4.
10. Id. at 26, col. 2.
11. Administered Prices: Hearings Before the Subcomn. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comn. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 16790 (1961).
12. Id. at 17067.
13. Id.
14. Antitrust Division Memorandum on United States v. The Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company, at 2 (Feb. 23, 1976) (referring to files of 1950s) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
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moral uprightness or drug addiction, are irrelevant to the calculation
of a sentence justified by general deterrence, since the offender is not
being imprisoned for the purpose of self-improvement. Under such
circumstances, tailoring sentences to suit personal characteristics actu-
ally undermines deterrence by making the sentences more uncertain
and difficult to predict in advance. As Judge Marvin Frankel has
noted, "Since the effects for general deterrence .. .are really aimed
at people other than the defendant himself, uncertainty in the sen-
tence tends to diminish or dissipate its impact."' Thus, to the extent
that Judge Renfrew was influenced by the defendants' status as pillars
of the community and by their physical innocuousness to their fellow
citizens, he either misperceived the purpose of antitrust sanctions or
considered factors irrelevant to the appropriate purpose.
Although the number of offenders prosecuted by the Antitrust
Division has been increasing substantially in recent years-24 persons
were indicted for Sherman Act violations in fiscal 1972, more than 100
in fiscal 1976-those convicted of antitrust violations usually have
received light sentences, with little or no prison time imposed.'0 Even
the fines that were imposed were little more than license fees when
compared with the benefits realizable from price fixing. In any case,
since price fixers for a number of years have run the risk of incurring
criminal fines, single damages in actions on behalf of the United
States, and treble damages in actions by private plaintiffs, the growing
number of violations suggests that in the price fixer's cost-benefit
analysis monetary sanctions do not carry great weight.
That businessmen consider imprisonment the most costly of penal-
ties may not necessarily dispose of the sentencing issue. Some of Judge
Renfrew's respondents, for example, argued against imposing prison
sentences for antitrust violations on the ground that the antitrust laws
are too complex to put businessmen on notice of what constitutes
criminal conduct. 7 This argument is untenable, for it has long been
Antitrust Division policy to proceed criminally only where there were
willful violations of the law (with willfulness being presumed in cases
of clear, per se offenses) or where there is evidence that the defendants
knew they were violating the antitrust laws or acted with flagrant
15. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 109 (1973).
16. No one convicted of antitrust violations received prison sentences during fiscal
1962-1968, the seven years following the electrical equipment sentences. From 1969 to
the present, fewer than a dozen individuals have received prison sentences of more than
30 days. Antitrust Division data on file with Yale Law Journal.
17. See Renfrew, supra note 3, at 601 n.20, 603.
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disregard for the law.-1 Where complex or novel issues of law are
involved, or where there is clear evidence that the defendants did not
appreciate the consequences of their actions, the Division proceeds
civilly.
In the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Congress
recognized the need for greater criminal antitrust sanctions and in-
creased the maximum penalties under the Sherman Act to a three-year
jail term and $100,000 fine for individuals and a $1-million fine for
corporations.19 This congressional mandate, as well as the evidence
indicating that prison sentences are uniquely effective in deterring
antitrust violators, prompted the Antitrust Division to adopt sentenc-
ing guidelines calling for recommended prison sentences ranging from
18 months to three years, depending on the presence of specified ag-
gravating factors.20 Applying the provisions of the parole statutes, such
sentences would translate to approximately five to eleven months
actually served.
21
The Antitrust Division believes that prison sentences in this range
will achieve the deterrent effect necessary to enforce the Sherman
Act.2 2 More than 15 years ago an Attorney General characterized
antitrust violators in the same light as "the racketeer who siphons off
money from the public in crooked gambling or the union official who
18. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMM. TO STUDY THr:
ANTITRUST LAWS 349 (1955); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION oF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 110; Address by Assistant Attorney General Donald I.
Baker, Federal Bar Association Antitrust Briefing Conference (Feb. 28, 1977), reprinted in
804 ANTITRUST & TRADE REc.. REP. (BNA) A-17 (Mar. 8, 1977).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975). Previously the maximum sentence for individuals
was one year imprisonment and a $50,000 fine, and for corporations was a S50,000 fine.
20. Antitrust Division Memorandum on Guidelines for Sentencing Recommendations
in Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act (Feb. 24, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal),
excerpted in 45 U.S.L.W. 2419 (Mar. 8, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sentencing Guidelines].
Eighteen months, tile midpoint of the range prescribed by Congress, is a base period
designed to deter tile average individual from participating in an average price-fixing
conspiracy. Under tile new guidelines, the Antitrust Division will consider five aggravating
factors in determining whether to raise its recommended sentence: (1) amount of com-
merce involved; (2) position of the individual; (3) existence and degree of predatory or
coercive conduct; (4) duration of participation; and (5) previous conviction. Personal,
family, or business hardship, cooperation with the Government, and the extremely small
scope of the conspiracy are mitigating factors that will be applied to reduce the recom-
mended sentence. Id.
21. Parole statutes provide for parole after one-third of the sentence, less time off for
good behavior, has been served. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161, 4162, 4202 (1970).
22. The Division has also taken the position that individual fines, starting from a
base of $50,000 and adjusted upward or downward by the same aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors applicable to prison sentences, are a second-best option and should be sought
only where the court refuses to impose prison sentences. Fines will be recommended
against corporations, based upon 10% of the corporation's total sales in the affected line
of commerce during tile conspiracy. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 20.
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betrays his union members." - 3 The absence of any substantial punish-
ment for convicted antitrust offenders since that time, however, has
prevented that perception from becoming widespread. If antitrust
violators are subjected to the serious criminal penalties recommended
by the Antitrust Division guidelines, businessmen will begin to
realize that price fixing is a "real" crime. Moreover, heavy sentences
will publicize the underlying violations and serve to inform the
businessman of the kind of conduct that is illegal. After all, potential
antitrust violators are a class of potential criminals who read news-
papers and consult lawyers.
Public reaction to alternative sentences, like the speechmaking re-
quirement imposed in the paper label case, indicates that these novel
approaches do attract attention the first time they are used. But as
their novelty wanes, so will their- "communicative possibilities."
' 4
Furthermore, such sentences are neither sufficiently unpleasant nor
sufficiently stigmatizing to drive home the point that price fixing is a
crime and convicted price fixers are felons. The point must be con-
veyed in order to induce general compliance with the law despite the
temptation that the perceived gains from price fixing may offer.25
Finally, alternative sentences only reinforce the perception that white-
collar criminals are accorded special treatment by the criminal justice
system. The only suitable punishment for price fixing, therefore, given
the purposes to be served, is a prison sentence. The hope, of course, is
that the threat of such a sentence will be sufficient to deter price fixing
substantially and that the punishment will seldom need to be imposed.
We shall never know unless we try.
23. Department of Justice News Release, at 9 (Nov. 13, 1961) (address by Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy before Economic Club of New York) (on file with Yale Law
Journal).
24. Renfrew, supra note 3, at 594. See id. at 617.
25. The Ethiopians may have found a solution. It was reported last year that seven
Ethiopian merchants were charged with overpricing and attempting to create artificial
scarcity in grain and peppers. The Ethiopian military rulers summarily executed the
merchants. In the following three weeks, prices for those commodities dropped by
nearly 60%. Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1976, § A, at 21, col. 3.
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Alan M. Dershowitzt
Among the punishments devised by the "humane Mikado" was one
requiring "society sinners"-the 19th-century equivalent of today's
corporate criminals-to "hear sermons from mystical Germans."' Judge
Renfrew has reversed the roles somewhat: his "prisoners pent" do the
preaching rather than the listening. But the "object all sublime" re-
mains the same: "to let the punishment fit the crime."
The elusive quest for the fitting punishment has riveted the atten-
tion of lawmakers from the beginning of recorded history. The Biblical
"eye for an eye" reflects at once the centrality of relating the punish-
ment to the crime and the difficulty of going beyond simplistic sym-
metry. 2 The creation of an enduring proportionality between a crime
and its punishment is an unrealizable goal in a world in which the
perceived seriousness of neither the crime nor the punishment remains
constant for more than a fleeting historical moment. What is a
realizable goal-indeed an indispensable necessity in a democratic
society of law-is the development of institutions capable of reassessing
the relationships between crimes and punishments and of determining
appropriate punishments for particular crimes and criminals at a given
point in time.
In attempting to evaluate his own actions in imposing the novel
punishment of compulsory preaching for the crime of corporate price
fixing, Judge Renfrew has, I fear, failed to ask the crucial question.
He has asked a series of substantive questions: whether the sentences
he imposed were too harsh or too lenient; whether they had sufficient
deterrent impact on other potential antitrust violators; whether the
failure to imprison white-collar criminals is fair in the context of a
policy of imprisoning lower-class offenders. As the responses cited in
Judge Renfrew's article indicate, reasonable people disagree about the
answers to each of these and the other questions raised by the Judge.
The critical institutional question-and the one he never asks-is
whether it is the proper function of an appointed judge, iii a democratic
society, to devise and impose novel punishments about which there is
certain to be a fundamental diversity of views.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. IV. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, The Mikado, in THE COMI'LLTE PLAYS OF GILBERT AND
SULLIVAN 343, 382-83 (Mod. Library ed. n.d.).
2. This paraphrases a point made and elaborated in Dershowitz, Indeterminale Con-
finement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 297-98 (1974).
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No one would quarrel with Judge Renfrew's authority to deviate
from the normal application of a statutory provision if that would
promote the legislative purpose under circumstances not anticipated
by the legislators. For example, a judge might have to devise a suit-
able "special" punishment for a convicted felon who could not endure
the legislatively prescribed imprisonment because-to use a recent
example with which I am familiar-he had spent years in a concentra-
tion camp and had become suicidal at the prospect of even short-term
reconfinement. But the paper label case was not an occasion requiring
what Justice Cardozo might have termed "interstitial legislation." 3
Rather, Judge Renfrew devised a wholly new genre of punishment-
one that he knew would be controversial-and proceeded to impose it
on a group of typical offenders convicted of committing what the
Judge himself calls a "classic violation ' '4 of a conventional statute.
Admittedly, the Judge took this course of action with the best of
intentions, in the most open and self-questioning way. But was the
decision properly his to make?
The kind of decision Judge Renfrew made, involving the weighing
of policy alternatives with general application, is quintessentially a
legislative one. It is clear that no democratic society would ever al-
locate to an individual judge the authority to decide-on a case by
case basis-whether classic violations of the antitrust laws should or
should not be deemed criminal. Nor would it allocate to an individual
judge the authority to decide-without any statutory guidance-the
appropriate punishment for a typical violation of a criminal statute.-
These are decisions that should be made by the most representative
elected bodies in a democratic society. The legislative process, what-
ever its shortcomings in practice, is the most open: debates are public,
votes are recorded, and legislators are accountable to the electorate in
the next election.
Judge Renfrew, in deciding that compelled lectures are the appro-
priate punishment for "classic" price fixers, has performed this legisla-
tive function and performed it well. He has invited input from a wide
range of concerned citizens; he has been open about the reasons for
his actions; and he has made himself accountable-at least to the
academic and professional community. But his well-intentioned actions
3. See B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-15 (1921).
4. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 591, 592
(1977).
5. For a discussion of the problem of assigning responsibility for sentencing decisions,
see Dershowitz, Background Paper, in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON
CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 117-24 (1976).
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raise the most profound questions about the proper limits of judicial
authority in deciding which punishments "fit" a given crime.
To be sure, in recent decades judges have exercised enormous dis-
cretion-virtually unbounded by legislative limitations and almost
entirely unreviewable-in the imposition of criminal punishments and
in the creation of a vast array of sometimes bizarre probationary
conditions.' But such widespread judicial discretion has been almost
universally criticized in recent years.7 The need for legislatively im-
posed uniformity-or at least standardization-in sentencing has be-
come apparent to most observers of the criminal justice system. Recent
legislative proposals, almost without exception, have been moving in
the direction of curtailing judicial discretion and enhancing legislative
responsibility for the standardization of sentencing.8
It is against the background of this important movement for uni-
formity that Judge Renfrew's decision to fashion a novel and question-
able punishment and apply it to one isolated group of typical of-
fenders should be evaluated. The upshot of his "creative" sentencing
is that certain typical price fixers are now sontenced to imprisonment,
while other typical price fixers-indistinguishable from those who are
imprisoned except by the luck of the draw of judges-are now sen-
tenced to give lectures. Which is the "correct" sentence is really be-
side the point: the important fact is that typical price fixers are
receiving extremely disparate sentences for reasons having nothing to
do with their individual culpability. Such disparity, which is rampant
in sentencing today, contributes to the widespread perception-among
all segments of our population-that our courts are not administering
evenhanded justice.
There is an urgent need for greater uniformity in antitrust sen-
tencing. I have proposed elsewhere the adoption of what I call "pre-
sumptive sentencing."9 Under that system, or any of the many varia-
tions of it that are now under consideration by legislatures around the
6. See Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis. 51 GLO. L.J. 809 (1963);
Note, Limitations Upon Trial Court Discretion in lmposing Conditions of Probation, 8
GA. L. REV. 466 (1974).
7. E.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 3-25 (1973); NATIONAL ADVISORY CO.tIr'N ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 141-47 (1973).
8. See, e.g., S.181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONc. Ric. S373 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977)
(bill introduced by Sen. Kennedy to establish, inter alia, guidelines for sentencing); 1976
Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, at 4752 (California legislation abolishing indeterminate
sentencing).
9. Dershowitz, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1975, § 6
(Magazine), at 27. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
supra note 5, at 19-61; A. VON Hmscn, DOING JUSTICE 98-106 (1976) (Report of the Comm.
for the Study of Incarceration).
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country, a single sentence-or at least a narrow range of sentences-
would be prescribed by the legislature (or by a legislatively created
commission) as presumptively appropriate for typical first-offender
price fixers. In the absence of specified mitigating or aggravating cir-
cumstances, this presumptive sentence would be imposed by the sen-
tencing judge. Whether the appropriate presumptive sentence for
typical first-offender price fixers should be a three-month prison term,
a specified fine (either absolute or proportionate to profits or assets),
a requirement to give lectures, or any combination of the above,
would be determined by the legislators (or commission) as a matter of
general policy rather than by a particular judge as a matter of in-
dividualized justice.
If Judge Renfrew's sentence is the one that most appropriately fits
the crime of price fixing, then let the legislature adopt compelled
lecturing as the presumptive sentence for that crime. If our society is
unwilling to adopt this punishment as the appropriate one for all
typical price fixers, then no single judge-regardless of his good will,
creativity, or sophistication-should take it upon himself to impose
this punishment on one fortuitously selected group of typical price
fixers.
In Gilbert and Sullivan's Titipu, governmental functions ranging
from Chief Justice to Commander-in-Chief to Archbishop were "all
rolled into" the personage of one Pooh-Bah. In Judge Renfrew's United
States, the authority to legislate rules of general application is sepa-
rated from the authority to judge particular cases. Judge Renfrew's
decision to devise a novel punishment for typical price fixers en-
croached on the legislative prerogative.
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Judge Renfrew has reminded us what a difficult, distasteful business
sentencing is. The judge must be concerned with the impact of the
sentence upon the life of the offender and his family. He must also be
concerned with its impact on society. Frequently, these concerns clash
-nowhere more often than in white-collar cases. The crime is serious.
The defendant is the fellow next door. That was the dilemma con-
fronting the sentencer in the paper label price-fixing case.
Judge Renfrew is a member of a new generation of judges who
sentence not by instinct but by textbook. Having concluded, in the
paper label case, that general deterrence was the only valid theory of
punishment, he was understandably dissatisfied with the traditional
choice of sanctions. Fines alone seemed too lenient to serve as a dis-
couragement to others bent on violating the antitrust laws. Imprison-
ment, on the other hand, seemed too harsh because the defendants
were "community leaders of previously unsullied reputation, who
held top executive positions in their corporations."' Accordingly,
Judge Renfrew devised a unique alternative-fines with a requirement
that the defendants deliver lectures about their offenses to business
and civic groups.
Based on responses from audiences before whom the defendants
appeared, and reactions from others, Judge Renfrew, with more than
a tinge of doubt, suggests that his experiment may have served its end
of promoting obedience to the antitrust laws. I remain a nonbeliever.
We know little about deterrence of antisocial behavior. But this
much may safely be said: If the maximum statutory penalty for price
fixing were a fine and an obligatory speech, then the antitrust laws
would be as forbidding as the village parking ordinance. Experience
shows that businessmen and their advisers are more willing to take
liberties with the antitrust laws when the only sanction is a civil fine,
an injunction, divestiture, or damages-as under § 7 of the Clayton
Act and most of the Robinson-Patman Act--than they are when a
miscalculation can lead to imprisonment. For the purse snatcher, a
term in the penitentiary may be little more unsettling than basic
training in the army. To the businessman, however, prison is the
inferno, and conventional risk-reward analysis breaks down when
t Member, New York Bar.
1. Renfrew, Tle Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 592 (1977).
2. See ABA, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 94-100, 119-20, 155 (1968).
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the risk is jail. The threat of imprisonment, therefore, remains the
most meaningful deterrent to antitrust violations.
The embarrassment of appearing before one's peers as a convicted
offender does not have the same impact as imprisonment. It is true
that public humiliation is a venerable form of punishment aimed at
discouraging others from following in the offender's footsteps. Our
colonial forebears put offenders in stocks. Our mainland Chinese con-
temporaries place dunce caps on their deviants and parade them be-
fore the public with signs proclaiming their crimes. But Judge Ren-
frew's experiment has demonstrated that speechmaking by businessmen
is not a comparable experience, particularly before an audience of
peers: the speeches aroused sympathy for the defendants, not ridicule.
Moreover, as Judge Renfrew is the first to recognize, the impact of
his speechmaking edict stemmed largely from its novelty. If routinely
given to all white-collar offenders, the exercise, I submit, would be
more punishing to the audiences than to the speakers.
Judge Renfrew also acted in the belief that the fines themselves had
some deterrent value. But, as one judge wrote in his response to Judge
Renfrew, fines are often absorbed, one way or another, by the corpora-
tion-and through it by its customers and stockholders. Indeed, the
indemnification statutes of many states now permit corporations to
reimburse convicted executives for their criminal fines and expenses
if they acted in good faith for the benefit of the company and had no
reasonable cause to believe their conduct was illegal.3 Loss of a job is
a more costly possible consequence of conviction, but apparently none
of the paper label defendants suffered this fate.
As his principal evidence that the sentences served a deterrent func-
tion, Judge Renfrew points to the comments by the business audiences
that the lectures made them more conscious of the antitrust laws and
more determined to seek guidance from their lawyers. He believes that
if the defendants had been more candid in describing their behavior
the deterrent effect would have been strengthened. I believe that the
evidence suggests the contrary.
Virtually all the businessmen who responded to Judge Renfrew's
questionnaire stated that they had been aware before attending the
lectures that price fixing is illegal. Moreover, jail sentences for
3. See Klink, Liabilities Which Can Be Covered Under State Slatlles and Corporate
By-Laws, 27 Bus. LAw. 109, 109-14 (1972); Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law
of Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAw. 95, 98-101 (1967). The
expansion of statutory indemnification coverage may haie been prompted in part by the
large fines imposed on the corporate executives convicted in the electrical equipment
price-fixing case of 1961. See Watkins, Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases-Their In-
plications for Government and for Business, 29 U. Cmr. L. REV. 97, 100 (1961).
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businessmen invariably receive wide publicity in a community, there-
by heightening consciousness of the antitrust laws. What sent the
defendants' audiences scurrying to their lawyers, I submit, was the
defendants' self-serving obfuscation of their offenses. The responses
quoted by Judge Renfrew stress that the defendants portrayed them-
selves as unwary victims of complex and unintelligible laws, who were
convicted for something far short of price fixing. What group of
businessmen, upon hearing that they could be subject to criminal
prosecution for seemingly lawful conduct, would not run to their
lawyers for an explanation? If the defendants had frankly acknowl-
edged that they had engaged in collusive bidding and market alloca-
tion, their audiences might have found their speeches less alarming.
Ironically, the very distortions that bothered Judge Renfrew gave the
speeches their most didactic impact.
The suggestion that the court should have retained some control
over the speeches to ensure candor is a bad idea. If judges are not only
to impose speechmaking requirements but to edit the text of the
speeches, serious First Amendment issues will cloud the whole sen-
tencing process. Why should the judiciary have any more right than
Congress to tell a citizen what to say or what to think? Courts have
correctly limited the power of prison officials to censor communica-
tions by incarcerated offenders.4 They should not now get into the
business of censorship themselves in order to avoid the unpleasantness
of imposing a jail sentence.
One may also question Judge Renfrew's premise that general deter-
rence is "the only theory of punishment that could justify imprisoning
the defendants."' Community expectations are also a legitimate factor
in the calculus of punishment. It is not always clear by what standard
Congress decides to make particular forms of undesirable business be-
havior subject to criminal, not just civil, penalties. Whatever the
criterion, however, the very act of branding violations criminal creates
an expectation that imprisonment will be the normal punishment.
This expectation is reinforced in price-fixing cases by the headline
publicity surrounding prosecutions.
When antitrust offenders routinely escape jail sentences, there is an
appearance of preferential treatment. I say "appearance" because, in
reality, first offenders are customarily put on probation except for the
most violent crimes, and a thief with the community credentials of
an antitrust defendant would not face imprisonment. But there is a
pervasive belief in our society that businessmen are immune from the
4. E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
5. Renfrew, supra note 1, at 592.
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sanctions of the law, and cynicism toward the criminal justice system is
particularly pronounced among the disadvantaged.
The publicity about ingenious sentences such as those imposed in
the paper label case may, as Judge Renfrew believes, serve the worthy
end of increasing awareness of the antitrust laws. But the publicity also
amplifies the impression of a double standard of justice. What street
criminal was ever sentenced to make speeches? Silent suspended sen-
tences at least do not create the same impression that the judge is
doing something extraordinary for the defendant because he is a
businessman.
The near unanimity among Judge Renfrew's respondents that his
sentences were appropriate does not assuage this concern. The de-
fendants' audiences were caught in the same dilemma as the sentencing
judge. According to the survey, they believed that antitrust violations
were "serious or moderately serious" crimes.6 Yet nearly 90% of those
who responded agreed with the sentences, and some of the dissenters
would have been even more lenient.7 This apparent inconsistency is
not puzzling. As Judge Renfrew observes, "[t]o decide to incarcerate
a fellow human being is difficult," s particularly when, through ex-
posure, a judge or a member of an audience can see that the defendants
are not very different from his neighbors, or from himself. Distance,
however, turns the heart to stone. Judging from the newspaper cover-
age, the public at large was far less sympathetic to the defendants'
predicament and considered the sentences to be no punishment at all.
And most of the members of the audiences responded that prison sen-
tences should be imposed on price fixers-but on strangers, not on
persons whom they had met.
In my view, therefore, tested by Judge Renfrew's stated goal, the
speechmaking sentences appear to be failures. They are not realistic
deterrents; indeed, they are likely to inspire more skepticism than
respect for legal institutions. Judge Renfrew's reasons for not im-
posing jail sentences on otherwise good citizens may seem appealing,
but they exist in almost all antitrust cases. The defendants generally
are individuals with unblemished reputations, a record of philanthropy
or other community service, and a family with which the judge can
sympathize. If these factors are to rule out jail sentences, then the
threat of imprisonment will not remain a credible deterrent in anti-
trust cases.
The reluctance of judges to impose sentences of imprisonment upon
6. Id. at 600 & n.18.
7. Id. at 602.
8. Id. at 603.
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white-collar first offenders has evoked unwise demands to circumscribe
too severely the discretion of sentencing judges. The Antitrust Division
is now urging that as a general rule there be prison sentences of 18
months in all antitrust cases. 9 Other prosecutors have demanded that
all defendants convicted of business crimes be given a "taste" of jail.1"
These demands for mandatory prison sentences go too far. They are
an overreaction to the frequency of suspended sentences. To believe
that judges must overcome their inhibitions about sending white-collar
offenders to prison is not to say that imprisonment is always the ap-
propriate punishment. It is not; and the threat of imprisonment as a
deterrent can be preserved without imposing jail sentences in every
case.
Flexibility and common sense remain essential to a fair sentencing
process. Not all defendants are the same; nor is all unlawful behavior
deserving of the penalty of imprisonment. Age, health, degree of
culpability, and past record are still appropriate criteria for all crim-
inal sentences. Some business executives will, because of their con-
victions, lose their livelihood; others will not. Some will admit their
offenses; others will conceal them. Given the differences among of-
fenders, even uniform sentencing standards and procedures-sorely
lacking in our courts-will and should lead to disparate results.
The difficulties of sentencing are accentuated in the new kinds of
white-collar cases with which prosecutors are now experimenting.
Judge Renfrew was dealing with a classic case of price fixing. All but
one of the defendants acknowledged that they knew that their conduct
was illegal. Many judges, however, are being faced with new classes of
offenses created by the present trend toward criminalizing all forms of
unethical business conduct.
It once was a first principle of our law that no one could be tried
for a crime unless the offense had been defined by the legislature in
advance with sufficient clarity to warn the offender of the consequences
of his conduct. But today laws and regulations to which criminal
sanctions have been tacked are often so vague and complex that the
verdict, ex post facto, defines the crime. Consider these examples:
0 Last year, a transportation executive was tried under the Railway
Labor Act" for committing the crime of an unfair labor practice-a
9. See Antitrust Division Memorandum on Guidelines for Sentencing Recommenda-
tions in Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act (Feb. 24, 1977) (on file with Yale Law
Journal), excerpted in 45 U.S.L.W. 2419 (Mar. 8, 1977).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1976, § 1, at 25, col. I (reporting interview with
United States Attorney for Southern District of New York).
11. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (1970).
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concept so elastic that the National Labor Relations Board has had
to evolve its meaning on a case-by-case basis. The executive was found
guilty by a jury. Although unfair labor practices by industrialists are
not even criminal offenses under the National Labor Relations Act,'
12
he was sentenced to jail under the Railway Labor Act.13
* The publisher of Hustler was given a seven-to-twenty-year sen-
tence14 for distributing a magazine that in most states would be con-
sidered constitutionally protected.
* Without waiting for Congress to enact a law making overseas
bribery as such a federal crime, the Justice Department has formed a
task force to search the United States Code for provisions that can be
stretched to authorize such prosecutions. 1
Under present standards it is easier to convict an accountant for the
crime of securities fraud than to hold him civilly liable. It is surely
easier to convict a publisher than to obtain a civil- finding by a judge
that a publication is obscene. And the form-book charge for con-
spiracy, applied to cases of business offenses, can and does lead to
guilty verdicts based on vicarious liability under circumstances in
which the executive could not be held civilly liable for the corpora-
tion's acts. We are pushing the criminal sanction to its outer limits;
and where an offense is not well-articulated, jail sentences can have a
chilling effect on legitimate activity.
Courts must therefore resist demands for prison sentences in all
white-collar cases. Jail sentences are frequently appropriate, even if
only for short terms. But not always. General deterrence is only one
consideration. Fairness, hard to define and impossible to measure, is
a more important one.
Ultimately, that is what makes Judge Renfrew's decision not to send
the defendants to jail so difficult to evaluate. Although suspended
sentences may not be effective deterrents, they may be appropriate in
the circumstances of a particular case. Judge Marvin Frankel has
written that sentences are "judgments that must turn in the end upon
the weighing of values, interests, and choices in the everyday province
of legal rather than psychiatric study."' 6 I am inclined to believe that
judges who are as conscientious about sentencing as Judge Renfrew
will do the right thing-for society as well as for the individual. But,
please, no more speeches.
12. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Fanning, Remedies under tile
Talt-Hartley Act, in 1971 BNA LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 142, 143.
13. United States v. Winston, No. 75-CR-83 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1976).
14. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 5.
15. Id., Oct. 14, 1976, at 53, col. 1.
16. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 56 (1973).
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Stanton Wheelert
I applaud Judge Renfrew for his candid admission that in sen-
tencing we know not what we do, and for his effort to overcome our
ignorance. It is unusual to find a sentencing judge so clearly expressing
the need for firmer empirical guidance in sentencing, and rare indeed
to find a court that takes the initiative in providing potentially
relevant data. My enthusiasm for Judge Renfrew's endeavor is tem-
pered, however, by doubts about the sanctions he imposed; the as-
sumptions he implicitly holds about the roles of defendant, judge, and
attorney in the criminal process; and the methods he employed to
study the effects of his sentences. I shall comment briefly on the first
and second of these points and more fully on the defects of the study
and how they might be remedied.
My disquiet about the sanctions is simply this. Probationary condi-
tions traditionally have been imposed to promote the defendant's
welfare. Abstinence from alcohol in the case of a drinking check-
writer, therapy for the sex offender, or prohibitions against associating
with other offenders are common examples. But probationary condi-
tions are increasingly being used to fashion novel sanctions. Some-
times they are imposed to bring the offender closer to the victim (e.g.,
price fixers in the milk industry being required to work in charity
dining halls'); sometimes, as in this case, to bring special attention to
the offense; and sometimes, undoubtedly, for still other purposes. The
conditions are real sanctions, imposing very special obligations on the
offender. And they are being judicially imposed.
What should be the limits of such judicially imposed sanctions? A
principle of criminal law is that the potential offender should know
the nature of the penalties to which he is subject for the commission
of an offense. If a judge can make literally anything a condition of
probation, this basic principle is violated. Suppose Judge Renfrew
wanted to reach an audience larger than the membership of the 12
civic, business, or other groups the offenders were asked to address.
Could the Judge have imposed a modern version of the scarlet letter,
perhaps some visible symbol to be worn on the businessman's suit,
announcing his conviction on a price-fixing charge? Perhaps less ex-
treme, could he dictate the actual words spoken to the civic groups in
t Professor of Law and Sociology, Yale University.
1. See White-Collar Justice: A BNA Special Report on White-Collar Crime, 44
U.S.L.W., pt. II, at 10 (Apr. 13, 1976).
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question? That he might like to do so is suggested by his apparent
displeasure that some offenders presented themselves in a sympathetic
light, and by his suggestion that the offenders' speeches might require
"[c]loser judicial supervision. ' 2 The desirability of restricting judicial
creativity is addressed, apparently, by only one of the persons from
whom Judge Renfrew solicited opinions.: Yet it would appear to be
the single most crucial question raised by his sentences, for such
judicially imposed sanctions transfer to the judicial branch functions
historically resting with the legislature.
I turn now to the delicate subject of judicial chutzpah. It is one
thing to recognize the authority of the bench, quite another to insist
that the judicial reality is the only reality of worth or relevance in the
criminal process. At several points in his presentation, Judge Renfrew
seems to reflect that view. His charge to the defendants was lacking in
specifics. Indeed, it gave them great leeway, seemingly, in presenting
themselves to their various audiences. Each was to "'make an oral
presentation... about the circumstances of this case and his participa-
tion therein.' ", The order did not require a humble admission of
guilt, or a presentation of the case as it may have appeared to pros-
ecutor or judge. Yet when Judge Renfrew learned that the offenders
were perceived sympathetically and that their accounts stressed fea-
tures other than those he would have stressed, he was taken aback.
They had failed to make clear the "true nature of their unlawful
conduct."''
He also asked each counsel to "disassociate himself from his role
as advocate, 'and instead [to] approach the issue from the perspective
of a judge' ";6 but he notes that some found it impossible to do so, and
he suspects that others "though perhaps not conscious of their pro-
fessional bias, were similarly unable to transcend their role as advo-
cates."7 In the case of both the defendants and their attorneys, then,
there was a failure, an incapacity, to experience the events as did the
judge."
But is it not expecting too much, in the highly structured world of
the courtroom with its distinctive roles, to expect any of its actors
2. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 617 (1977).
3. Id. at 615 n.30.
4. Id. at 590.
5. Id. at 600.
6. Id. at 607 n.25.
7. Id.
8. There is one important difference in the two cases. Attorneys who announced their
incapacity to adopt the judge's perspective are regarded as showing "admirable candor."
Id. No such charitable phrases are invoked in behalf of the defendants.
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easily to adopt the perspective of one in a very different position?
Offenders of all types tend to develop accounts of their conduct that
enable them to conceive of themselves as "not really criminal" even
though in violation of the law. They normalize their deviance, ex-
plaining it to others and themselves in a variety of ways that make it
more tolerable and that may come closer to explaining the pattern of
their involvement, as subjectively experienced, than does the picture
perceived by a judicial officer. If this is true of embezzlers ("I was
really borrowing the money temporarily"), forgers ("You can't really
hurt anybody with a pen") and swindlers ("You can't cheat an honest
man"), why not in the malum prohibitum world of the price fixer?"
This observation leads me to offer a suggestion to Judge Renfrew
concerning the problem of general deterrence. If there are multiple
definitions of the social reality of conviction, each corresponding
roughly to the social roles played by the parties (prosecutor, judge,
defense attorney, and defendant) it is a mistake to assume that any one
party can easily play another's role. As we would not send a boy out
to do a man's work, perhaps we should not send an offender out to
do the court's work. Perhaps it is enough to be convicted and subject
to the usual toils of conviction. If the judge has a view of the appro-
priate moral and legal tone to be expressed in conveying the message
of general deterrence, he should deliver it directly or through a bureau
of public information attached to the court. The offender is unlikely
to be able to deliver the same message as the judge, for, alas, he did not
experience the process from the same lofty position.
Whatever my reservations about the sanctions, I am struck by the
innovative effort of Judge Renfrew and his clerks in undertaking the
evaluation of them. As the Judge notes at a number of points, the
inquiry was not conceived or carried out with scientific precision. On
the assumption-and hope-that other legal officials may share Judge
Renfrew's desire to learn more about the effects of their actions, I will
explore some of the weaknesses of the Judge's inquiry in order to
provide a fuller appreciation of the problems they pose and to suggest
solutions.
Judge Renfrew's study has the following characteristics:
1. The analysis is based on the responses of a nonrandom, 4%
sample of the population that heard the speeches.' 0
9. Similarly, I suspect that the attorney who finds it easy, within a given case, to
embrace the role of both his adversary and the judge, may play his own part with a
bit less rigor and conviction. It is one thing to comprehend the moves of the adversary
and the bench, quite another to identify with their perspectives.
10. Renfrew, supra note 2, at 595 & n.11.
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2. That population itself is difficult if not impossible to enumer-
ate.."
3. The relevant sample for most of his purposes is his "cate-
gory one," 57 total respondents 12 sometimes reduced to close to
50 because of nonresponse to particular questions.'
3
4. The questionnaires were filled out some six months to a year
after the event they were designed to evaluate.' 4
5. The questionnaires were solicited by a person (the judge) who
had a direct stake in the results of the study.
6. The primary measure of long-term "effect" is a response to a
single item on the questionnaire.'3
Each of these characteristics creates problems in interpreting Judge
Renfrew's results, but each could be remedied in future studies.
1. The problem of unrepresentative respondents. The fact that-
Judge Renfrew's questionnaires were returned by only 4% of those
who heard the talks is critical not so much because 4% is small but
because we cannot know whether that 4% is representative of the
other 96%. After all, major polling agencies do quite well in predict-
ing national outcomes from samples of far less than 4% of the popula-
tion at large. The difference is that they work very hard to achieve a
representative sample. In the case of Judge Renfrew's study, however,
there is every reason to believe that these respondents were distinctly
unrepresentative. Frequently in social research, questionnaire respon-
dents differ from nonrespondents in that they tend to care more or
know more about the issues addressed in the survey. If this was true
in Judge Renfrew's study, it means that the sample was probably
biased towards a more articulate, more knowledgeable audience, those
who had already been closer to some of the issues than had the non-
respondents. There is simply no warrant for assuming, in this case,
that the 4% who did respond were typical of the population as a
whole. Yet how easy it is to forget this possible bias in the presentation
of the results. Judge Renfrew, for instance, notes, "Of the persons who
responded to the questionnaire, about 40% in the business category
... had heard of the defendants' offenses before attending a speech."' 6
It is quite likely, however, that the 4% of the respondents on whom
11. Id.
12. Id. at 595-96.
13. E.g., id. at 600 n.18, 601 n.21.
14. Id. at 595-96 n.11.
15. Id. at 605 (question concerning changes in busincss practice).
16. Id. at 596-97.
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this "40%" is based were more cognizant, more "tuned in" than the
remainder of the audience population. In making an accurate assess-
ment of the impact of these sanctions, we have to assume that the
whole process had a different impact on those who responded to the
questionnaire than on those who did not bother to do so.
What can be done about this nonrandomness of response? A num-
ber of corrective measures can be taken. Some of these are not cheap:
often survey analysts engage in call-backs or recontacts with those who
have failed to respond, and give up only after extraordinary efforts
have been made to elicit responses from everyone in the sample. That
would be impossible without more resources than those available to
the Judge. But the Judge probably could have done much better with
the limited resources available to him. For example, instead of spend-
ing a given amount of energy trying to reach all those who heard
any of the 60 speeches, the Judge might have selected a smaller sample
and invested the energy thus saved in trying to get a complete response
from this smaller group. If pursued persistently, people usually respond
to survey researchers. Had the Judge concentrated his efforts he
would have been able to come closer to a representative sample of
respondents, a cornerstone of any fruitful study of effects. As it is, we
simply cannot know what to make of the Judge's results because we
have no idea whether the respondents were typical of those who heard
the speeches.
2. The problem of specifying the population. Judge Renfrew wished
to reach all those who had attended the speeches given by his five con-
victed offenders. This presumes that someone was taking attendance at
all the meetings, and that all those (and only those) who had attended
the sessions were reached via questionnaire. The Judge reports that
the population of speech listeners approximated 2700.17
If all these persons did hear the defendants, and if all of them did
receive questionnaires, and yet only 4% cared enough to respond, that
would indeed tell us something about the general lack of impact of
the talks. It is difficult to tell from Judge Renfrew's account of the
process of reaching the various groups precisely what transpired. But
there is no evidence that it was anyone's formal responsibility to
locate all those who had heard the message. Quite possibly, the Judge
was successful in reaching some groups, unsuccessful in reaching others.
(One would get some feeling for this if information were introduced
with regard to the relative success of the sampling for each of the 60
17. Id. at 595.
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different groups, or each of the 5 different speakers, or each of the
persons who arranged to put the speaker and group together.) In any
event, a full interpretation requires that we know much more about
who attended the meetings.
The relevance of these unknowns becomes clear if we focus for a
moment on the population we may presume Judge Renfrew was most
interested in reaching, namely, those businessmen who may engage in
antitrust violations or who may directly influence those in a posi-
tion to do so-what we may call the "population of potential of-
fenders." Judge Renfrew clearly wished to separate the population
of potential offenders from other respondents (hence his distinction
between "category one" and "category two"), but a full interpretation
would require that we know more about the distribution of those
categories in the various groups. One group, for example, was a law
school class. Now, students in a law school may someday be in a posi-
tion to fix prices, but they probably were not when they heard the
speech. If there were many groups like this (and we have no idea of
the distribution of groups), then perhaps the "population of potential
offenders" who heard the speeches was only a half, or a quarter, or
even a tenth of the total population that heard the speeches. If that
were the case, then we might attach more significance to the 57
businessmen who actually responded to the questionnaire. At the
same time, we might have grave doubts about the value of a means for
spreading the message of deterrence that reached only a small portion
of the population of potential offenders.
From the materials before us, however, it is virtually impossible to
know what significance to attribute to the numbers and findings re-
ported in the article. Interpretation of the results would have been
much easier if a brief survey had been taken at the time of each group
meeting, simply to identify those in attendance and perhaps to record
their addresses for a followup questionnaire. Such straightforward
procedures, if invoked at the outset of similar undertakings in the
future, would improve greatly the basic quality of the data and would
allow a much fuller and more confident interpretation of the findings.
3. The problem of total sample size. Suppose that neither of the
above problems had plagued Judge Renfrew's study. Suppose, in fact,
that he had been able to draw a true random sample from the subset
of the population with which he was most concerned, namely his
category one. Would we then have a firm basis for generalization to
the business population at large? Yes, but only within the broadest
limits. Sampling theory tells us that if we were to draw repeated
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random samples of 50 from a very large population, we could expect
to observe quite different proportions from sample to sample de-
pending on the persons we happened to choose. Over all possible sam-
ples of 50, the mean of all the various sample proportions would ap-
proximate the proportion in the population from which they were
drawn. But any one sample might diverge from it by quite a bit. Judge
Renfrew is concerned, for example, with whether the sentences he
meted out increased public awareness of antitrust violations. He tells
us that 40% of category one respondents had heard the message. If
they had been randomly chosen from the population, the odds are
about one in 20 that the true population figure might be as low as
26% or as high as 54%.
Whether that is a sufficiently narrow range could well be a matter
of discussion in connection with the implications of the report. Here
I simply want to highlight that, even if the sample had been drawn
according to all requirements of sampling theory, a sample as small as
50 leaves room for a good deal of fluctuation in the result. Presurvey
consideration of the minimum number of respondents necessary for
a given level of accuracy might have dictated a different sampling
strategy.
4. The problem of timing. Judge Renfrew notes that the idea for
the study came some months after the sentences and that the project
was mounted over six months after the speeches themselves were de-
livered. Judge Renfrew wanted to use the followup questionnaires to
find out what actually transpired when the speeches were delivered-
how the offender presented himself, how he characterized his offense,
and the like. For this purpose, the six-month-to-one-year delay is much
too long. Memories fade, other events intervene, and persons move or
change jobs between speech and survey.
But the Judge was also interested in long-term effects, for which
this period of followup is not long enough. Perhaps an optimum
design, with the Judge's interests in mind, would have been a factually
oriented interview (or questionnaire) administered shortly after the
discussions, focused heavily on the content of the speeches and the
impression made by the speakers, and followed-up over a year later to
trace the effects of the speech on the subsequent behavior of the
listeners. By trying to combine in a single research instrument a study
of the offenders' presentations and a study of long-term effects on
listeners, the Judge may have learned little about either subject.
5. The problem of solicitation. The role in which a researcher is
cast is likely to influence the responses he or she elicits. In this in-
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stance the Judge was aware that his formal role as the sentencing
authority might influence the respondents, and in his cover letter he
tried to reassure them so that they would respond with candor. But a
common finding in most interview or questionnaire situations is that
respondents try to please the investigator, and, if unsure of themselves,
they may give a response they feel the investigator wishes to hear. In
this case one wonders whether the responses would have been very
different if the study had been carried out by a group independent of
the sentencing judge-a group that had no stake whatever in the
efficacy of this mode of sentencing. Relative to the other problems
presented by this research, this particular one may seem minor. But
it is important to remember that the researcher's role does have some
effect on how the audience responds, and to be conscious of that effect
in designing and interpreting a survey.
6. The problem of measuring effect. Given the Judge's concern for
the effects of his sanctions, in particular the possible promotion of
general deterrence, it is a bit surprising that only one of the survey
questions addressed directly whether changes in business practice re-
sulted from hearing a defendant speak. That question did indeed
yield a number of interesting responses, the most revealing of which,
one presumes, are reported in the article. But since the question of
effect seems so crucial, since the "communicative possibilities" of the
sentences are among the primary reasons the Judge offers for im-
posing them,' it seems that a good deal more should have been done
to try to define their impact. For example, if the Judge perceived the
sentences as affecting chiefly the persons who heard the speeches, he
might have specified in the questionnaire possible changes in business
practice resulting from the speeches, perhaps with a checklist of actions
persons might have taken. As it is, the open-ended character of the
question, especially given the lapse of time, left a good possibility that
the respondents would not recall some changes that had been intro-
duced.
It seems more likely, however, that the Judge hoped the speeches
would have a ramifying effect, with the listeners themselves conveying
the message through conversations with friends, business acquaint-
ances, and the like. This perspective might have suggested another set
of questions: "Have you initiated conversations with other business-
men that were based upon the talk you heard? About how many? To
your knowledge have any of them made real changes in their com-
pany practices because of their awareness of this case?"
18. Id. at 594.
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These are only a few of the problems and potentialities of survey
design raised by Judge Renfrew's study. Under ideal experimental
conditions we would carefully assign different sanctions to similar
offenders so as to assess the effects. Judge Renfrew is surely right in
suggesting that this cannot be done, save in the rarest of instances.
Short of a true experiment, one might select for comparison a group
of businessmen who did not hear the speeches, to see if, as implied,
they do less to prevent price fixing in their companies than do those
who were audience members.
Even the general kind of survey undertaken by Judge Renfrew can
teach us something. What we learn, of course, depends on how the
survey is conceived and carried out. The most important lesson is that
planning is crucial. Most of the weaknesses of Judge Renfrew's survey
could have been overcome with adequate preparation, beginning prior
to the imposition of the sentences themselves. It would not have re-
quired an enormous investment of resources, especially if the Judge's
clerks could have been used as research assistants.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to expect too much from any
one such study, even if the design defects were removed. The novelty
of the sanction poses grave problems of generalizability, and a variety
of local conditions may influence outcomes. That is why it is so im-
portant that more of these studies be launched.
Those in a position to undertake studies like Judge Renfrew's
should familiarize themselves with the rudiments of social research so
that they can design studies that produce reliable and useful results.
This is not to suggest that judges become social scientists or that every
judicial decision be evaluated empirically. For judges who are in-
terested in taking advantage of social science techniques, however,
assistance should not be hard to enlist. A number of law schools have
faculty members who could provide some training and who might also
be able to aid in research design. In addition, experts in sampling and
in survey design and analysis can be found in survey research centers
at many large universities.
Like the craft of lawyering, the craft of social research is part
technique, part judgment, part experience. It is becoming increasingly
relevant to the legal system, as we search for better ways of accom-
plishing such legal tasks as sentencing. If we can develop within the
legal profession a greater capacity to design and conduct meaningful
social research, we will take a major step toward providing answers to
the important questions that Judge Renfrew has raised.
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